

~~SECRET~~

23 April 1970

A PLAN FOR THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ON SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT MILITARY FORCES
AND DEVELOPMENTS

1. Requirement: National intelligence on Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces and developments is needed at several levels: by the President and his immediate staff, by the NSC members, by planning and senior operational echelons in the Department of Defense and the Department of State, by the senior planners and operators in the armed services, and by other agencies such as ACDA.

2. National intelligence on these subjects is now provided to many of these consumers daily in the CIB (Red and Black) and quarterly in the President's Quarterly Report on Soviet Strategic Forces.

3. To serve the varied needs of the different levels of consumers and to draw more fully on the major intelligence producers concerned with Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces and developments, an approach is proposed that would tailor the national intelligence estimates to specific needs. Under this approach, the national intelligence estimates would be produced in layers. The generalized needs of more senior consumers would be served by the top layer, while at the same time the body of analysis and scholarship underlying the general judgments would be presented separately.

4. This approach envisions two kinds of national intelligence estimates on Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces and developments. One would be the mission-oriented paper, produced annually and grouping the forces in categories which fit US military planning needs. NIEs of this kind are especially relevant to US defense program planning as it attempts to decide upon future US forces and strategies, and to allocate resources between general purpose and theater nuclear forces on the one hand and strategic nuclear forces on the other. The other kind

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

of NIE would be the issue-oriented paper, produced as Soviet (or possibly other) weapons or force developments gave special moment to a particular subject. Papers on the SS-9 ICBM or Soviet ABM developments would be current cases in point.

5. Each of these kinds of NIE would characteristically be structured along the following lines:

- I. Major judgments and conclusions.
- II. The evidence and analysis in brief.
- III. A detailed statement of evidence and analysis, with supporting annexes as required.
 1. Present Situation (not necessarily in order given):
 - A. Force Levels.
 - B. Doctrine - Strategy - Objectives.
 - C. Political Factors - Threat Perception - Economic Constraints and Considerations.
 - D. Technological Developments - R&D and Testing.
 2. Potential Developments - A five year outlook on feasible alternative trends and developments.
 3. Most Likely Developments - A five year projection of the most likely course of events.

The above would be supported by detailed annexes, such as:

Annex: The Evidence - Development programs, Characteristics, Deployment, etc. (OSI, FMSAC, OSR)

Annex: Current Status of Forces (OSR)

Annex: Alternative Five Year Projections of Forces with Underlying Rationale (OSR)

~~SECRET~~

6. The layered structure should be built from the bottom up. OSI, FMSAC, and OSR would be responsible for preparing Part III in the above outline, with contributions from DIA as desired. The objective would be the full development of all pertinent evidence related to the subject; the clear statement of analytical methods used in interpreting the evidence; the identification of what is known, what is assumed, and what cannot be resolved; the elaboration of possible alternative interpretations; and the rationale for projected forces and developments. A single manager for each Part III could be named from OSI, FMSAC, or OSR for the purpose of preparing and coordinating the draft for USIB consideration.

7. The roles of BNE and the ONE Staff under this approach could be along these lines: BNE could continue in essentially its present role, with one Board member having an overseeing responsibility in working with the OSI, FMSAC, or OSR single manager; ONE Staff could prepare an annual estimate of Soviet military policy (being a kind of summation of the mission- and issue-oriented papers produced under the other system and bringing larger Soviet political and economic questions into consideration); Parts I and II of the above outline could be the particular responsibility of ONE Staff, especially if Parts I and II were to be published in some manner separate from Part III.

8. This plan does not endorse the idea of maintaining a book on Soviet and Warsaw Pact military strengths and capabilities on a looseleaf basis with partial changes being issued from time to time. There are sound production reasons why this is probably not feasible. It might be possible, however, to create another publication resembling the present PQR which would handle reporting on general purpose forces in somewhat the way the PQR now takes care of the strategic forces.